State v. Burgess Appellant\u27s Brief 1 Dckt. 38702 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
10-5-2011
State v. Burgess Appellant's Brief 1 Dckt. 38702
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Burgess Appellant's Brief 1 Dckt. 38702" (2011). Not Reported. 280.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/280
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 











BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
HONORABLE RICHARD D. GREENWOOD 
District Judge 
MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. # 4843 
SARA B. THOMAS 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. # 5867 
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. # 7259 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 




KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1 
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1 
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings .............................................................................. 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL .................................................................... 5 
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 6 
I. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Burgess' 
Motion To Suppress ............................................................................. 6 
A. Introduction ...................................................................................... 6 
B. Standard of Review .......................................................................... 6 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Burgess' 
Motion to Suppress ......................................................................... 6 
1. The Arrest of Mr. Burgess Was Illegal ....................................... 7 
2. All Evidence Collected Against Mr. Burgess 
Following The Illegal Arrest Must Be 
Suppressed As It Is Fruit of The Illegal 
Governmental Activity ................................................................ 8 
II. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It 
Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Seven Years, With Two 
Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Burgess Following His Plea 
Of Guilty To Possession Of A Controlled Substance ............................ 9 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 13 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .............................................................................. 14 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) ............................................................ 7 
Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 976 P .2d 927 ( 1999) ......................................... 10 
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) .................................................................... 7 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) .................... 7 
Sampson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) ........................................................ 8 
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984) ...................................................... 8 
State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204,824 P.2d 135 (Ct. App. 1991) .......................... 10 
State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245,787 P.2d 231 (1990) .................................... 8 
State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141 ( 1991) ........................................................... 9 
State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385 (1992) .................................................................. 9 
State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293 (1997) ............................................................... 9 
State v. Lafferty, 139 Idaho 336, 79 P.3d 157 (Ct. App. 2003) ............................. 6 
State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 54 P .3d 464 (Ct. App. 2002) ............................ 7 
State v. McCall, 135 Idaho 885, 26 P.3d 1222 (2001) ............................ ,. ............ 6 
State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 P .2d 323 ( 1982) ...................................................... 1 O 
State v. Reinke, 1 03 Ida ho 771 ( Ct. App. 1982) ................................................... 9 
State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 651 P.2d 527 (1982) ...................................... 10 
State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102,897 P.2d 993 (1995) .............................. 6 
State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 125 P.3d 536 (Ct. App. 2005) ....................... 8 
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) ...................................................... 7 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) ................................................ 8 
ii 
Constitutional Provisions 
Idaho Const. Art. I, § 17 ........................................................................................ 6 
U.S. Const. amend. IV .......................................................................................... 6 
Statutes 
Idaho Code § 20-227 ............................................................................................ 7 
iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jason Lee Burgess appeals from the Judgment of Conviction and Commitment. 
After the district court denied his motion to suppress, Mr. Burgess entered a conditional 
plea of guilty to the charge of possession of a controlled substance. Mr. Burgess 
asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because 
his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, protected by the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I § 17 of the 
Idaho Constitution, was violated when law enforcement officers improperly arrested him 
without a warrant or probable cause and, as such, the evidence derived from the 
improper seizure must be suppressed. 
Furthermore, Mr. Burgess asserts that the district court abused its discretion in 
sentencing him to an excessive sentence without giving proper weight and 
consideration to the mitigating factors in his case. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On December 29, 2010, an Information was filed charging Mr. Burgess with 
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine. {R., pp.28-29.) The State 
later filed an Information Part 11, charging Mr. Burgess with being a persistent violator of 
the law. (R., pp.92-94.) 
Mr. Burgess filed a Motion to Suppress asserting that evidence was seized as a 
"result of an illegal arrest perpetrated by police." (R., pp.47-48.) In the Memorandum in 
Support, Mr. Burgess asserted that officers arrested him prior to the issuance of an 
agent's warrant and without probable cause. (R., pp.64-70.) Because the arrest was 
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illegal, he asserted that all evidence found in the subsequent search was a fruit of the 
illegal government activity and must be suppressed. (R., pp.64-70.) 
The State objected to the suppression motion. (R., pp.49-50.) The State argued 
in its Memorandum in Support, that Mr. Burgess had waived his 4th Amendment rights 
as a condition of parole, as result he had a diminished expectation of privacy, and that 
the search was allowed by the terms and conditions of Mr. Burgess' parole release 
agreement. (R., pp.82-84.) 
The district court held a hearing on the motion. (R., pp.95-100.) Mr. Burgess 
testified first and noted that he was arrested without being presented an arrest warrant. 
(Tr.3/2/11, p.7, L.1 - p .. 8, L.13.) He also acknowledged that he was on parole and had 
consented to searches of his person or property at any time, any place, by any agent of 
Field and Community Services. (Tr.3/2/11, p.9, L.2 - p.10, L.8.) 
The next witness was Ms. Tanya Shaw. Ms. Shaw testified that she was not 
Mr. Burgess' parole officer, but was on call during the arrest and search in question. 
(Tr.3/2/11, p.14, L.1 - p.15, L.11.) Ms. Shaw received a phone call from Officer 
Beaudoin and she authorized Mr. Burgess' arrest by telling the officer to arrest him on 
an agent's warrant and to search him subject to his waiver. (Tr.3/2/11, p.15, L.9 - p.17, 
L.23.) Ms. Shaw acknowledged that she gave Officer Beaudoin verbal permission to 
arrest, but did not issue an agent's warrant until after the arrest. (Tr.3/2/11, p.22, L.7 -
p.25, L.19.) Ms. Shaw also stated that she was using Officer Beaudoin as an agent of 
Field and Community Services that day. (Tr.3/2/11, p.34, Ls.12-23.) 
Officer Beaudoin also testified. He noted that he was on duty, located 
Mr. Burgess, arrested Mr. Burgess after being told to do so based upon an agent's 
warrant that would be issued if Mr. Burgess was located, and that he did not have other 
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independent grounds to arrest Mr. Burgess. (Tr.3/2/11, p.42, L7 - p.44, L.22.) After 
arresting Mr. Burgess, Officer Beaudoin waited while a drug dog was used, the dog 
alerted, he then called Ms. Shaw again and asked for permission to search a computer 
bag that had been alerted on, Officer Beaudoin was given permission by Ms. Shaw to 
conduct the search. (Tr.3/2/11, p.54, L.19 - p.55, L.18, p.58, Ls.7-15.) Officer 
Beaudoin was aware of the Fourth Amendment waiver and was working at the direction 
of Ms. Shaw that day. (Tr.3/2/11, p.66, L. 18 - p.67, L.6.) 
Following argument by counsel, the suppression motion was denied during the 
hearing. (R., pp.95-100.) Specifically, the district court found that: 
Further I believe it is within the scope of the law and not 
unreasonable that a police officer in the field is entitled to rely upon verbal 
conversations or test messages or however they communicate, but 
communications with agents of probation and parole. Local law 
enforcement is and should be entitled to act in good faith on the 
information received from probation and parole and aid probation and 
parole in the conduct of their duties. 
The natural consequence of that finding is that Officer Beaudoin 
and the other Boise Police officers at the scene were acting lawfully at the 
time they stopped and detained the defendant. There was nothing illegal 
about this detention. 
They were further acting under the lawful direction of an agent of 
probation and parole in searching the bag in conducting whatever search 
they conducted at the scene. 
The search was legal either because it was done with respect to 
the bag at the request and direction of probation and parole. It was also 
done incident to a lawful arrest. . . . if any error occurred in Officer 
Beaudoin's activity in stopping, detaining, and taking the defendant into 
custody, that error was cured by the later issuance of the agent's warrant, 
the actual issuance. 
(Tr.3/2/11, p.111, L.5 - p.113, L.6.) 
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Mr. Burgess then entered a conditional guilty plea to the possession of 
rnethamphetamine charge, reserving his right to challenge the district court's denial of 
the suppression motion. (R., pp.102-104.) At the sentencing hearing, the State 
recommended a sentence of seven years. (Tr.3/29/11, p.18, Ls.22-24.) Defense 
counsel requested a unified sentence of five years, with one and half years fixed. 
(Tr.3/29/11, p.27, Ls.1-3.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, 
with two years fixed. (R., pp.119-121.) Mr. Burgess filed a Notice of Appeal timely from 
the district court's Judgment of Conviction and Commitment. (R., pp.124-126.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Burgess' motion to suppress? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of 
seven years, with two years fixed, upon Mr. Burgess following his plea of guilty to 




The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Burgess' Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Burgess' right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was 
violated when officers illegally arrested him. The State failed to meet its burden of 
proof, failing to show that the officer had legal grounds for the arrest of Mr. Burgess and, 
as such, the district court's order denying Mr. Burgess' motion to suppress should be 
reversed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. State v. Lafferty, 139 Idaho 
336, 338 (Ct. App. 2003). When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence are accepted; 
however, the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found are freely 
reviewed. State v. McCall, 135 Idaho 885, 886 (2001 ). At a suppression hearing, the 
power to assess the credibility of all witnesses, weigh evidence, resolve factual conflicts 
and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 
Idaho 102, 106 (1995). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Burgess' Motion To Suppress 
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." 
U.S. Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const. Art. I, § 17. The purpose of these constitutional 
rights is to "impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by 
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governmental agents and thereby safeguard an individual's privacy and security against 
arbitrary invasions." State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-654 (1979)). The United States Supreme Court 
has held that when evidence is obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the 
judicially developed exclusionary rule usually precludes its use in a criminal proceeding 
against the victim of the illegal search and seizure. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 
(1987) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961 ); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 
(1914)). 
Mindful of Sampson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006), and Mr. Burgess' Fourth 
Amendment parole waiver, wherein he consented to searches of his person or property 
at any time, any place, by any agent of Field and Community Services, Mr. Burgess 
asserts that all evidence discovered as a result of the search following his illegal arrest 
must be suppressed as a fruit of illegal government activity. 
1. The Arrest Of Mr. Burgess Was Illegal 
Idaho Code § 20-227 governs arrests of parolees without a warrant. The 
relevant portion states that: 
(1) Any parole or probation officer may arrest a parolee ... without a 
warrant, or may deputize any other officer with power of arrest to do so, by 
giving such officer a written statement hereafter referred to as an agent's 
warrant, setting forth that the parolee ... has, in the judgment of said 
parole or probation officer, violated the conditions of ... his parole or 
probation. 
I.C. § 20-227. 
In the case at hand, the arrest of Mr. Burgess was illegal. At the suppression 
hearing, Officer Beaudoin acknowledged that Mr. Burgess was arrested only on the 
basis that the parole department was going to issue an agent's warrant, not on other 
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independent grounds. (Tr.3/2/11, p.42, L.7 - p.44, L.22.) Ms. Shaw, a parole officer, 
acknowledged that she gave Officer Beaudoin verbal permission to arrest, but did not 
issue an agent's warrant until after the arrest. (Tr.3/2/11, p.22, L. 7 - p.25, L.19.) 
Because Ms. Shaw did not authorize Officer Beaudoin in writing, in the form of an 
agent's warrant, to arrest Mr. Burgess, the arrest does not comport with I.C. § 20-227 
and is, therefore, illegal. 
2. All Evidence Collected Against l\/lr. Burgess Following The Illegal Arrest 
Must Be Suppressed As It Is Fruit Of The Illegal Governmental Activity 
The application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence is appropriate only 
to evidence that is fruit of the illegal governmental activity. Segura v. United States, 468 
U.S. 796, 815 (1984); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); State v. 
Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 249 (1990). The test is "whether, granting establishment of 
the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at 
by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be 
purged of the primary taint." Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 (quoting MAGUIRE, 
EVIDENCE OF GUil T, p. 221 (1959)). Suppression is required only if "the evidence 
sought to be suppressed would not have come to light but for the government's 
unconstitutional conduct." State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 184 (Ct. App. 2005) 
(quoting U.S. v. Nava-Ramirez, 210 F.3d 1128, 1131 (2000)). 
In the case at hand, the above argument shows that Mr. Burgess was illegally 
arrested. Had Mr. Burgess not been illegally arrested, the evidence located in the 
vehicle would not have been discovered. The State failed to meet its burden in showing 
that the evidence is untainted; therefore, all the evidence collected after the 
impermissible seizure must be suppressed as fruit of the illegal police activity. 
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II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Seven 
Years, With Two Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Burgess Following His Plea Of Guilty To 
Possession Of A Controlled Substance 
Mr. Burgess asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of 
seven years, with two years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the 
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will 
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See 
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Burgess does not allege that 
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse 
of discretion, Mr. Burgess must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence 
was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120 
Idaho 141, 145 (1991 ), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385 
(1992)). The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection 
of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of 
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v. 
Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978)). 
Mr. Burgess asserts that the district court failed to properly consider the 
mitigating factors that exist in his case. Specifically, he asserts that the district court 
failed to give proper consideration to his admitted substance abuse problem and desire 
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for treatment. Idaho courts have previously recognized that substance abuse and a 
desire for treatment should be considered as a mitigating factor by the district court 
when that court imposes sentence. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982), see also State 
v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204,209 (Ct. App. 1991). 
Mr. Burgess first began using alcohol at the age of six or seven. (PSI, p.148.) 
Later in life he recognized that his drinking was becoming a problem, he then stopped 
drinking. (PSI, p.149.) At the age of seven he began using marijuana, with daily use 
beginning at the age of eight. (PSI, p.149.) Methamphetamine use began at the age of 
eighteen and increased over time. (PSI, p.149.) Mr. Burgess expressed a desire for 
treatment during the sentencing hearing. (Tr.3/29/11, p.33, Ls.23-25.) 
Idaho courts have previously recognized that Idaho Code§ 19-2523 requires the 
trial court to consider a defendant's mental illness as a sentencing factor. Hollon v. 
State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). Mr. Burgess has been previously diagnosed as 
suffering from Depressive disorder NOA and Post-traumatic stress disorder. (PSI, 
p.150.) Mr. Burgess grew up with a very abusive father. (PSI, p.6.) In 1985, his father 
committed suicide and Mr. Burgess acknowledges that there is likely a strong 
connection between his childhood and this traumatic event and his self-destructive 
behaviors. (PSI, pp.6-7.) 
Furthermore, in State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982), the Idaho Supreme 
Court noted that family and friend support were factors that should be considered in the 
Court's decision as to what is an appropriate sentence. Id. Mr. Burgess has the support 
of his family. In the past, Sharon Hill, Mr. Burgess' mother has proven to be continually 
supportive. (PSI, pp.6, 144.) Mrs. Crystal Burgess, Mr. Burgess' wife wrote a letter of 
support for her husband noting his substance abuse issues and need for treatment to 
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be successful. (Letter from Crystal Burgess.) She also noted that she recently gave 
birth to a daughter and that she is confident that Mr. Burgess will change his life and be 
successful for his daughter. (Letter from Crystal Burgess.) John Lopez, Mr. Burgess' 
step-son also wrote a letter of support noting that he supports and believes in 
Mr. Burgess. (Letter from John Lopez.) Debra Olive, Jason's mother-in-law asked that 
Mr. Burgess be allowed an opportunity for treatment and noted that "I believe Jason is 
ready, willing, and able to do whatever it takes to straighten out his life and future." 
(Letter from Debra Olive.) 
Additionally, Mr. Burgess has taken responsibility for his actions in committing 
the instant offense. In State v. Alberls, 121 Idaho 204 (Ct. App. 1991 ), the Idaho Court 
of Appeals reduced the sentence imposed, "In light of Alberts' expression of remorse for 
his conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other 
positive attributes of his character." Id. 121 Idaho at 204. At the sentencing hearing, 
Mr. Burgess stated that: 
I'd like to apologize to my family, my son and my daughter, not only 
for bringing you to this hearing again and being back in court again but by 
bringing you through every day of my addiction with me, for not being 
there. It's not fair that you're our there with my daughter - our daughter 
and that I'm not there. And it kills me. 
I want you to know that, no matter what happens here today, when 
I will be released, I promise you that I will get treatment. And when I get 
home, I'm staying home. I'll never be gone again. Thank you, guys, for 
your love and your support. 
Your Honor, I'd like you to know that I do take responsibility for this 
crime. There's - there's been a lot of talk about minimizing it and kind of 
justifying that it's a relapse. It is that, but it is my relapse. My drug 
addiction is a crime. It's a felony. I completely understand that. 
That's part of the sickness of this drug and my addictions; even 
understanding it, I continue to do it. 
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You know, like she said, I haven't had treatment. I've never been 
through intensive treatment before. I've never been strong enough on my 
own to seek it, and I've just always been too far into my addiction to even 
see that I needed it. 
There's no way that I can look at my daughter and ever want to use 
drugs again. I feel that if I was to walk out today, I'd stand a good chance, 
just my daughter being in my life now alone, that I could make it. But I 
know that I need treatment because I don't - I don't want to miss another 
second. 
The hardest thing I've ever had to do in my life was sit in a prison 
cell while my daughter was being born. I couldn't use the phone. I 
couldn't be there to talk to her. I couldn't be there for my wife, anything. 
There's so many things that's happened in my life since my 
incarceration that I never thought I would ever have the experience of ever 
having to feel. I will never let an addiction or anything make me go though 
this again. I'll be there everyday for the rest of my life for my family. 
I believe that I need treatment. ... The bottom line is I need help. 
I've never been strong enough or smart enough to do it on my own. I'm 
asking you to please give me the help that I need. 
(Tr.3/29/11, p.28, L.14 - p.33, L.25.) 
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Burgess asserts that the district 
court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He asserts 
that had the district court properly considered his substance abuse, desire for continued 
treatment, mental health issues, friend and family support, and remorse, it would have 
crafted a less severe sentence. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Burgess respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order 
of judgment and commitment and reverse the order which denied his motion to 
suppress. Alternatively, he requests that that this Court reduce his sentence as it 
deems appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district 
court for a new sentencing hearing. 
DATED this 5th day of October, 2011. 
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
13 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5th day of October, 2011, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy 
thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
JASON LEE BURGESS 
INMATE #51633 
ISCI 
PO BOX 14 
BOISE ID 83707 
RICHARD D GREENWOOD 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
200 WEST FRONT STREET 
BOISE ID 83702-7300 
KIMBERLY SIMMONS 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
200 WEST FRONT STREET SUITE 1107 
BOISE IDAHO 83702 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE ID 83720-0010 
Delivered via e-mail to: patricia.miller@ag.idaho.gov 
EAA/ns 
NANCY SANDOVAL 
Admini~~tive Assistant 
14 
